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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
David Loren Curry appeals from his conviction for burglary, aggravated 
assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm with a persistent violator 
enhancement. On appeal, Curry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting his burglary and aggravated assault convictions. He also contends 
that the district court erred in failing to give the jury his requested self-defense 
instruction. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Melissa Ferra told police that her boyfriend, Curry, may have wrecked and 
abandoned her car. (Tr., p.69, Ls.19-20; p.70, L.10 - p.72, L.11.) The next night 
Ms. Ferra stayed at the house of Marlisa Gordon. (Tr., p.72, Ls.12-15; p.58, 
Ls.4-17). The next morning, they awoke to find the word "snitch" written in black 
marker on Ms. Gordon's front door and oil on her vehicle. (Tr., p.58, L.14 - p.60, 
L.8.) Curry admitted to his brother he had written the word "snitch" on the door 
and poured oil on the car. (Tr., p.133, L.25 - p.134, L.24.) 
After Curry's and Ms. Ferra's breakup and just a couple of days after the 
vandalism,1 Ms. Gordon's boyfriend, Travis Escudero, answered a phone call 
from a person he believed to be Curry stating he was "coming for [him]." (Tr., 
p.37, L.2 - p.39, L.14.) Around 35 minutes later, Curry arrived at Ms. Gordon's 
residence where she and Mr. Escudero were in the open garage, sitting on a 
1 The jury was instructed in Curry's trial they could use the admission of 
vandalism only as motive evidence. (Tr., p.135, Ls.3-11.) 
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couch located next to the door leading into the house, having a cigarette. (Tr., 
p.41, L.2 - p.42, L.13.) Curry walked up to the pair inside the garage, kicked 
over a coffee table and yelled and screamed at them. (Tr., p.42, L.15 - p.44, 
L.12.) Curry had a bag of clothing in one hand and kept his other hand in his 
pocket. (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-24.) 
While yelling and screaming at Mr. Escudero, Curry "made a gesture" with 
his hand and Mr. Escudero "saw a black piece of something" that he believed to 
be a pistol. (Tr., p.42, L.24 - p.43, L.1.) Mr. Escudero was frightened based on 
his belief that Curry had a gun and sent Ms. Gordon in to call the police while 
grabbing a one and one-half to two foot metal pole to protect himself. (Tr., p.43, 
Ls.1-11.) Curry responded by asking Mr. Escudero if he "want[ed] to go," which 
Mr. Escudero perceived as a threat of the use of a gun against himself because 
"what could you have in your pocket that would stop a pole?" (Tr., p.43, Ls.12-
17.) Curry continued to yell, then turned around and walked away while giving 
Mr. Escudero "the finger." (Tr., p.46, Ls.12-22.) 
When Curry's brother arrived home after work the same evening Curry 
threatened Mr. Escudero, he heard Curry on the telephone making reference to 
a gun to the person on the other end of the line. (Tr., p.135, L.20 - p.138, L.21.) 
A search warrant was ultimately served on Curry's mother's home, where Curry 
resided, and a loaded black pistol was eventually recovered from a box in a 
closet in the mother's room. (Tr., p.163, L.18 - p.164, L.14.) 
The state charged Curry with burglary, aggravated assault, felon in 
possession of a firearm, and malicious injury to property as against Ms. Gordon, 
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with a sentencing enhancement for being a persistent violator. (R., pp.11 0-112.) 
Curry entered a written plea of guilty to the malicious injury to property charge. 
(R., pp.107-109.) The trial court limited the state's case in chief to evidence of 
the burglary and aggravated assault charge and ruled that, if the jury returned 
verdicts of guilty, it would be provided with evidence on the charge of felon in 
possession of a firearm and the persistent violator sentencing enhancement. 
(Tr., p.14, L.1 - p.21, L.11.) 
Following presentation of the state's case, Curry made a Rule 29 motion 
for a judgment of acquittal asserting "no reasonable juror on the state of this 
evidence could return a verdict of guilt in regard to [Curry]." (Tr., p.198, L.22 -
p.199, L.1.) The trial court denied the motion, finding: 
[T]here is evidence sufficient in this record by which a reasonable 
juror would infer that Mr. Curry entered the garage intending to 
intimidate Melissa Ferra in that there was evidence that she lived at 
that house, was at that house frequently, that the word "snitch" was 
written on that door in reference to her at that house, and the oily 
substance poured over the car at that house where she lived. So a 
reasonable jury could infer that his reason for entering that garage 
was to intimidate a person who he believed may be a witness in a 
criminal proceeding in that he believed that she had, in the 
vernacular, "snitched him off to the police about the car wreck 
incident." 
There's evidence by which the Jury could also reasonably 
infer that he intended to commit aggravated assault on the 
occupants, at least Mr. Escudero, of that garage by the fact of the 
evidence that he kept his hand in his pocket, which had the black 
metallic object, at all times during the few minutes of confrontation. 
That he had his hand in his pocket as he walked in. He kept his 
hand in that pocket. And then as things began escalating, he 
pulled that object out. The Jury could infer that he intended to 
commit an assault with a deadly weapon or a firearm based on that 
evidence. They could infer that. 
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The Jury could also infer that that [sic] object in his pocket 
was a handgun. They may not find that. They may find that. It 
would be a reasonable inference under all of the circumstances of 
this record for them to make that decision that the State has proved 
that this was a handgun with which Mr. Curry committed the other 
elements of assault. 
(Tr., p.205, L.24 - p.207, L.3.) The defense rested without presenting evidence. 
(Tr., p.213, Ls.11-15.) The jury returned a verdict finding Curry guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt of burglary and aggravated assault. (R, p.206; Tr., p.220, 
Ls.8-24.) Curry admitted the bases for the persistent violator enhancement and 
agreed to waive his right to a jury determination of the felon in possession of a 
firearm charge at which time the trial court found him guilty based on the jury's 
prior finding of three of the four elements of the offense in addition to his status 
as a felon by his own admission. (Tr., p.229, L.18 - p.238, L.10.) 
Curry again moved the trial court for a judgment of acquittal or in the 
alternative a new trial asserting "that the evidence adduced by the State was 
insufficient to cause a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(R, p.208; Tr., p.241, L.18 - p.242, L.1.) The court denied Curry's motion, 
finding the verdict was not contrary to the law or evidence: 
Again, I'm not going to reiterate all the findings that I have 
previously made in previously denying the Rule 29 motions for 
judgment of acquittal, incorporate those rulings and findings and 
conclusions in finding that this verdict was not contrary to the 
evidence. 
It is not contrary to the law as well, and the motion for new 
trial will be denied. It is not contrary to the law because, if the Jury 
[sic] has evidence by which they can find that the State has proved, 
by the applicable burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
all of the elements of aggravated assault and all of the elements of 
burglary have been proved by the State, then there was no law 
4 
application that this verdict would be contrary to law based upon 
that evidence. 
Now, the contrary law argument that the defense makes -
puts forward here is that the Court just simply allowed too much 
impeachment evidence of witness Melissa Ferra's testimony, and 
this - but the defense does not cite any standard by which what is 
too much evidence, what is too much impeachment evidence, what 
is evidence by which a jury can not [sic] follow the Court's 
instructions and apply the limited admissibility rules that the Court 
instructed the Jury on many times. 
(Tr., p.252, L.7 - p.253, LA.) The court sentenced Curry to concurrent unified 
sentences of 13 years with the first four years fixed for the burglary conviction, 
15 years with the first five years fixed on the aggravated assault, and 13 years 
with four fixed for being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Tr., p.277, L.9 -
p.278, L.2; R., pp.223-226.) Curry timely appeals. (R., pp.230-233.) 
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ISSUES 
Curry states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was the evidence sufficient to support the convictions? 
2. Was a self-defense instruction improperly denied? 
3. Was the new trial motion improperly denied? 
(Appellant's brief, p.12.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there substantial, competent evidence presented at trial from which 
the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Curry was guilty of burglary 
and aggravated assault? 
2. Has Curry failed to show the district court committed instructional error by 
concluding Curry was not entitled to a self-defense instruction at his trial 
for aggravated assault? 
3. Has Curry failed to carry his appellate burden of showing error in the 




There Was Substantial, Competent Evidence Presented At Trial To Support The 
Jury Verdict Finding Curry Guilty Of Burglary And Aggravated Assault 
A. Introduction 
Curry challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his burglary 
and aggravated assault convictions. Specifically, he contends that the state 
failed to prove Curry's intent when entering the garage rose to the level 
necessary to support a burglary conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-15.) He 
asserts as to the aggravated assault conviction that "the state failed to present 
sufficient evidence that a deadly weapon was present." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) 
Curry's arguments are without merit. A review of the record and the applicable 
law shows that the state presented substantial, competent evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Curry entered the garage with the necessary 
intent to commit a burglary and that a deadly weapon was used in the 
commission of his assault on his victim Mr. Escudero. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt. State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hart, 112 Idaho 759,761,735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting 
this review the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to 
7 
the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 
Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict. State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 
698,701,946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1997); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 
P .2d at 1072. 
C. The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence That Curry 
Entered The Garage With The Intent To Commit a Felony 
Count I of the second amended information charged Curry with burglary in 
violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-1401 and 19-2514. (R., p.110.) For Curry to be 
guilty of that offense, he had to enter Ms. Gordon's residence "with the intent to 
commit the crime of witness intimidation and/or aggravated assault." (See Jury 
Instruction No. 12, R., p.188.) See also I.C. § 18-1401 (intent required for 
burglary is "intent to commit a felony"). Contrary to Curry's assertions on appeal, 
a review of the record and the applicable law shows that the state carried its 
burden. 
Curry asserts on appeal the state failed to prove Curry entered the garage 
at Ms. Gordon's residence with either the intent to commit witness intimidation or 
aggravated assault. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) The district court correctly 
concluded there was sufficient evidence by which a reasonable juror could infer 
that Curry entered the garage "intending to intimidate Melissa Ferra." (Tr., p.205, 
L.23 - p.206, L.1 0.) 
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The state presented evidence that Ms. Ferra stayed overnight at Ms. 
Gordon's house and spent a considerable amount of time there (See Tr., p.56, 
L.4 - p.57, L.19 (testimony of Ms. Gordon regarding Ms. Ferra's visitation 
habits); Tr., p.70, LS.3-9 (testimony of Ms. Ferra as to her frequent stays at Ms. 
Gordon's house)), and that Curry believed Ms. Ferra had "snitched" on him to the 
police and had once taken action to show his displeasure with her for doing so 
(see Tr., p.133, L.22 - p.135, L.11 (testimony of Curry's brother regarding 
Curry's admissions to him that he had committed the vandalism at Ms. Gordon's 
house and the trial court's instruction to the jury that such information could be 
considered as possible motive evidence).) The state presented substantial 
evidence upon which the jury could conclude Curry entered the garage on the 
date in question with the intent to find Ms. Ferra and confront her about informing 
the police of her suspicions that he had taken and wrecked her car. 
Curry further asserts the state failed to prove he entered the garage with 
the intent to commit aggravated assault. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) Specifically, 
Curry argues "the state did not prove the presence of a gun." (Appellant's brief, 
p.14.) The district court correctly found a jury could reasonably infer that Curry 
entered the garage with the intent to commit aggravated assault on the 
occupants: 
There's evidence by which the Jury could also reasonably 
infer that he intended to commit aggravated assault on the 
occupants, at least Mr. Escudero, of that garage by the fact of the 
evidence that he kept his hand in his pocket, which had the black 
metallic object, at all times during the few minutes of confrontation. 
That he had his hand in his pocket as he walked in. He kept his 
hand in that pocket. And then as things began escalating, he 
pulled that object out. The Jury could infer that he intended to 
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commit an assault with a deadly weapon or a firearm based on that 
evidence. They could infer that. 
The Jury could also infer that that [sic] object in his pocket 
was a handgun. They may not find that. They may find that. It 
would be a reasonable inference under all of the circumstances of 
this record for them to make that decision that the State has proved 
that this was a handgun with which Mr. Curry committed the other 
elements of assault. 
(Tr., p.206, L.11 - p.207, L.3.) 
The state presented evidence that Mr. Escudero believed at the time 
Curry entered the garage he had a gun in his pocket. (See Tr., p.42, L.11 -
p.46, L.17 (testimony of Mr. Escudero regarding Curry's demeanor, actions, and 
his own observation of an item consistent with a gun in Curry's pocket).) This 
evidence is coupled with the threatening phone call (Tr., p.37, L.2 - p.39, L.14), 
Curry's own statements overheard by his brother the night of the assault relating 
to a gun (Tr., p.136, L.1 - p.137, L.S), and the subsequent retrieval of a black 
handgun with dark brown grips from the home in which Curry resided (Tr., p.164, 
Ls.4-12). Curry likens the current situation to an allegation of assault based 
strictly on a bulge in the pocket coupled with a threatening gesture. (Appellant's 
brief, p.15.) That is simply not what the evidence against Curry showed. Mr. 
Escudero, an individual trained as a sniper with war time experience, testified 
Jhat Curry's actions and demeanor taken with the metal object consistent with a 
gun sticking out of his picket led him to believe at the time that Curry had a 
weapon; it did not occur to Mr. Escudero at the time that it could be anything 
other than a gun in Curry's pocket. (Tr., p.33, L.25 - p.34, L.25; p.45, Ls.15-24.) 
The state presented substantial evidence upon which the jury could conclude 
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Curry entered the garage on the date in question with the intent to commit an 
aggravated assault upon the inhabitants with the weapon concealed in his 
pocket. 
D. The State Presented Substantial, Competent Evidence That Curry 
Committed An Assault With A Deadly Weapon 
Count II of the second amended information charged Curry with 
aggravated assault in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-901, 18-905, and 19-2514. 
(R., p.110.) For Curry to be found guilty of that offense, he needed to have 
committed an assault upon Travis Escudero "with a deadly weapon," alleged to 
have been a handgun. (See Jury Instructions No. 17, 18, R., pp.193-194.) See 
also I.C. § 18-905(a) (defining aggravated assault as assault with a deadly 
weapon or instrument). Contrary to Curry's assertion on appeal that "the state 
failed to present sufficient evidence that a deadly weapon was present" 
(Appellant's brief, p.15), a review of the record and the applicable law shows 
that the state carried its burden. 
Curry again asserts "the state failed to present sufficient evidence that a 
deadly weapon was present." (Appellant's brief, p.15.) As discussed above, the 
state presented sUbstantial evidence upon which a jury could conclude Curry 
had a weapon when he assaulted Mr. Escudero. The district court correctly 
determined, when reviewing the evidence and reasonable inferences from that 
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party that "[t]he jury could 
infer that that [sic] object in [Curry's] pocket was a handgun .... It would be a 
reasonable inference under all of the circumstances of this record for them to 
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make that decision that the State has proved this was a handgun. " (Tr., 
p.206, L.22 - p.207, L.2.) 
II. 
Curry Has Failed To Show There Was Instructional Error As A Result Of The 
Trial Court Declining To Give A Self-Defense Instruction 
A. Introduction 
Curry complains the trial court erred in declining his request for a self-
defense instruction because, he contends, the "denial was based on an 
erroneous understanding of the law and is reversible error." (Appellant's brief, 
p.17.) Curry is not entitled to relief because he has failed to demonstrate he was 
entitled to such an instruction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 65, 844 
P.2d 691, 694 (1992); Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261,265,16 P.3d 937,941 (Ct. 
App. 2000). A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous 
, 
statement of the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible 
comment on the evidence or is adequately covered by other instructions. State 
v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873,881,736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987); State v. Turner, 136 
Idaho 629,632-33,38 P.3d 1285, 1288-89 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Camp, 134 
Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether a reasonable view of 
the evidence supports an instruction is a matter within the trial court's discretion. 
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State v. Bush, 131 Idaho 22, 32, 951 P.2d 1249 (1997); State v. Howley, 128 
Idaho 874,878,920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996). 
C. Curry Was Not Entitled To A Self-Defense Instruction 
Curry claims the trial court erred in denying his request for a self-defense 
instruction. (Appellant's brief, pp.17-21.) Curry's claim fails because he failed to 
meet his burden of establishing such an instruction was supported by the 
evidence. 
A district court may properly refuse a requested instruction which is not 
supported by the evidence. State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 873, 881,736 P.2d 1327, 
1335 (1987); State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 669-70, 726 P.2d 772, 781-82 (Ct. 
App. 1986) (self-defense instruction not supported by evidence). To be entitled 
to an instruction on an affirmative defense, a defendant must "present facts 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case relevant to [the] defense." State v. 
Camp, 134 Idaho 662, 665-66, 8 P.3d 657, 660-61 (Ct. App. 2000). In order to 
prevail on his claim that he was entitled to a self-defense instruction, Curry must 
demonstrate from the record "evidence of reasonable fear of some level of bodily 
harm," State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999), 
and that the assault he committed was a reasonable response to the level of 
threat posed by the victim, State v. Mason, 111 Idaho 660, 670, 726 P.2d 772, 
782 (Ct. App. 1986). A review of the record shows that the district court properly 
rejected the requested self-defense instruction because there was no evidence 
whatsoever that there was any threat from the victim at the time of the assault. 
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In denying Curry's request for a self-defense instruction, the district court 
correctly concluded that the evidence presented at trial failed to show any 
subjective fear on the part of Curry or that such fear would be objectively 
reasonable. (Augmented Tr., p.20, L.6 - p.22, L.16.) Curry asserts the district 
court was incorrect to require Curry to show subjective fear in order to utilize a 
self-defense instruction and that such a requirement would place Curry in a 
position that he may have to take the stand to testify on his behalf at trial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-21.) Curry relies on State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 
989 P.2d 346 (Ct. App. 1999), for his position that the district court erred in 
denying his request for a self-defense instruction because there is "no 
requirement of a subjective fear on the part of the defendant." (Appellant's brief, 
p.19.) The district court's conclusion that there were "no facts in this record by 
which this jury could reasonable infer that Mr. Curry was in fear" (Augmented Tr., 
p.21, L.25 - p.22, L.1) is consistent with the holding in Hansen that: 
it was not necessary that there be evidence that Hansen 
reasonably feared great bodily harm in order to warrant a self-
defense instruction. Rather, evidence of a reasonable fear of some 
level of bodily harm will suffice. 
133 Idaho at 329, 986 P .2d at 352. Here, the testimony at trial showed Curry to 
be the aggressor, with Mr. Escudero grabbing a pipe near the end of their 
interaction to protect himself from what he felt was the threat of being shot by 
Curry. Contrary to Curry's assertions, the district court correctly found the jury 
was presented with no evidence that Curry was acting in a manner based on a 
reasonable fear of bodily harm, "nor were there any facts by which a jury could 
reasonable infer fear." (Augmented Tr., p.21, Ls.13-14.) 
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Because Curry failed to establish any grounds for giving an instruction on 
self-defense, he is not entitled to relief. 
III. 
Curry Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Motion For A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Curry complains that the district court erred in denying his motion for a 
new trial because, he contends, the verdict was contrary to the law and 
evidence. (Appellant's brief, p.7 (citing Tr., pp.75-76).) Curry has failed to 
establish the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new 
trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. 
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 
119 Idaho 62,63,803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Curry's Motion 
For A New Trial 
Curry filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal asserting "that the 
evidence adduced by the State was insufficient to cause a reasonable juror to 
find guilt beyond reasonable doubt." (R., p.208.) At a hearing on this motion, he 
asked the court to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal or in the 
alternative to order a new trial in the "interest of justice." (Tr., p.241, L.18 -
15 
p.245, L.7.) On appeal, Curry asserts a new trial should have been ordered 
because the trial court abused its discretion in presuming the jury would follow 
the instructions limiting the scope of Ms. Ferra's testimony regarding her fear of 
Curry and his access to a firearm. (Appellant's brief, p.21.) 
In denying Curry's motion for a new trial, the district court discussed the 
testimony of Ms. Ferra and concluded that the jury was properly instructed 
that they could use [the] evidence [that Ms. Ferra was fearful of 
Curry and that she had seen him with a gun] only for the limited 
purpose of determining whether they believed the sworn testimony 
at trial that she had never seen Mr. Curry with a gun. 
(8/16/2010 Tr., p.253, Ls.13-19.) "[I]t is presumed that the jury follows a limiting 
instruction." State v. Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 175,911 P.2d 761,768 (Ct. App. 
1995). See also State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 146, _, 254 P.3d 47, 57 (Ct. App. 
2011) ("We presume that the jury followed the district court's [limiting] 
instructions.") There is nothing in the record to support Curry's claim that the jury 
was unable to follow the court's instructions. 
The district court correctly found, after reiterating its reasons for denying 
Curry's motion for judgment of acquittal, that there was sufficient evidence to 
support Curry's conviction and "the verdict [was] not contrary to law." (Tr., p.255, 
L.3 - p.256, L.13.) Curry has failed to show error in the denial of his motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Curry's judgment. 
DATED this 8th day of February 2012. 
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